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This paper explores the determinants of individual well-being as measured by self-reported
levels of satisfaction with income. Making full use of the panel data nature of the Ger-
man Socio-Economic Panel, we provide empirical evidence for well-being depending on
absolute and on relative levels of income in a dynamic framework. This ﬁnding holds
after controlling for other inﬂuential factors in a multivariate setting. The main novelty
o ft h ep a p e ri st h ec o n s i d e r a t i o no fd y n a m i ca s p e c t s :t h ei n d i v i d u a l ’ so w nh i s t o r ya sw e l l
as the relative income performance with respect to the others living in the society under
analysis do play a major role in the assessment of well-being.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation No.: D63, I31, D31.
Keywords: Interdependent Preferences, Inequality Aversion, Status, Subjective Well-
Being, SOEP.1 Introduction
A vast literature in the social sciences has shown that individual well-being depends on
what we see around us. As such, there is a relative notion according to which we compare
ourselves to neighbors, colleagues, more generally, to a reference group, and it matters
where we perceive ourselves in the social hierarchy. Social status of an individual plays,
indeed, an important role in the determination of well-being. Though most economists
are sympathetic to the idea that individual well-being depends on relative standing, tra-
ditional modelling has been reluctant to incorporate status considerations directly into
the analysis. Only in recent years have models been developed to describe the evidence of
these phenomena, to represent the preferences of individuals who care about their relative
standing and to examine their behavioral implications (see Section 2 for a review).
In this paper we propose a new functional form to represent interdependence of pref-
erences over income distributions, that is, an individual’s preferences that depend jointly
on the entire distribution of income, and use data from Germany over the period 1990 to
2004 to test its validity. Our idea is the following: well-being of an individual as measured
by the degree of personal satisfaction with respect to own income depends at time t on
four components. i) The absolute component, that is, the standard of living of the indi-
vidual at time t;i i )t h erelative component, that is, the income of the individual compared
to that of others at the same time t.B o t hc o m p o n e n t sh a v eadynamic counterpart: iii)
the absolute dynamic component, that is, how the individual performed in terms of own
income from time t − 1 to time t;i v )t h erelative dynamic component, that is, how the
individual performed from t − 1 to t with respect to others’ incomes.
The absolute component is standard in all economics modelling: utility of income
should depend directly on own material well-being. The relative component is present in
various models of interdependent preferences assuming alternative formulations such as
rank, relative income, per capita income, overall mean income, and sum of the income gaps
with respect to richer and poorer individuals. With interdependency, utility of income
depends not only on one’s own material well-being (the absolute component) but also on
one’s relative standing in society. The dynamic components aim at capturing the eﬀects
of history, both of the individual and of others. One’s own history is clearly relevant
to one’s well-being, because personal history is a major determinant of aspiration levels.
We hypothesize that the history of others will also have an impact on one’s well-being,
above and beyond one’s relative standing in society. Speciﬁcally, well-being depends not
only on one’s ranking in society in the past and at present. It can also depend on the
1situation of other individuals populating the income curve: if another individual, who
used to be behind in terms of income, succeeded in moving ahead, one’s well-being might
be aﬀected diﬀerently as compared to a situation in which the income ordering has been
preserved. An individual concerned with status might be particularly satisﬁed if he was
able to pass others and might show disappointment with his income if others were able
to pass him, in a way that will not be captured by his relative status in past and present
income distributions. This sentiment, captured by the relative dynamic component, is
in addition to that embedded in the absolute and relative components of well-being:
s o m e b o d yw h oe a r n sal o ta tt i m et and is higher up in the income scale at time t
might still show disappointment if others were able to pass him and he was not able
to pass anyone. The absolute dynamic component, on the other hand, focuses on own
history distinguishing between individuals experiencing an income growth from those on
a decreasing income path. Only an increase in income is expected to have a positive eﬀect
on income satisfaction. To the best of our knowledge, these dynamic components have
not appeared in the literature before and represent the novelty of our approach.
The role of an individual’s history in measuring well-being is contained also in Gilboa
and Schmeidler (2001) but with a diﬀerent perspective from the present contribution.
Their setting is more similar to habit formation (Pollak, 1970) than to the dynamic com-
ponents here introduced. “The individual’s own history of payoﬀsa ﬀects her aspirations.
For instance, when an individual is accustomed to a certain standard of living, her well-
being depends mostly on deviations from it.” (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 2001, p.270; see
also p.276 for a discussion.) Well-being then depends on the instantaneous payoﬀ deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between the objective payoﬀ and the individual’s aspiration. In this
paper, deviations from a certain standard of living are contained in the absolute dynamic
component while the relative dynamic component models explicitly the passing of or being
passed by others. The role of histories of others in measuring well-being, on the other
hand, appeared in Hirschman (1973), labeled as the tunnel eﬀect.1 “Suppose that the
individual has very little information about his future income, but at some point a few of
his relatives, neighbors, or acquaintances improve their economic or social position. Now
he has something to go on: expecting that his turn will come in due course, he will draw
1“Suppose I drive through a two-lane tunnel, both lanes going in the same direction, and run into a
serious traﬃc jam. No car moves in either lane as far as I can see (...). I am in the left lane and feel
dejected. After a while the cars in the right lane begin to move. Naturally, my spirits lift considerably,
for I know that the jam has been broken and that my lane’s turn to move will surely come any moment
now. Even though I still sit still, I feel much better oﬀ than before because of the expectation that I shall
soon be on the move.” (Hirschman, 1973, p.545.)
2gratiﬁcation from advances of others—for a while.” (Hirschman, 1973, p.546.) In the latter
contribution, though, the temporal aspect of the concept of history is somehow lost when
advances of others are simply considered as the presence of richer individuals, giving rise
to inequality in the present distribution of income. In our opinion, advances of similar
individuals are better captured by the relative dynamic component we propose.
Our paper is related to several strands of the economics literature. First, we contribute
to the literature on happiness by providing an explanation of the ‘happiness and income
paradox’, that is, the signiﬁcant but quite “modest”2 positive bivariate relationship found
between happiness and income, as reported by Easterlin (2001). This relationship, as
Easterlin (2001) wrote, “is further weakened by the introduction of controls of other
variables, such as unemployment and education.” Our results show that the utility of
Germans depends heavily on their relative standing in the society. Second, there is a link
to the experimental literature.3 The utility function that we propose is a generalization of
that introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Our results might shed light on the eventual
presence of inequality-aversion in a competitive market, where as opposed to a laboratory,
a whole society is involved. Third, our approach provides new insights regarding the
distribution of incomes. We test relative deprivation and satisfaction as proposed by
Yitzhaki (1979), Hey and Lambert (1980), Chakravarty (1997) among others, and the
passing phenomenon introduced by Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2007).
After a review of the theoretical literature on interdependence of preferences and on the
measurement of relative deprivation and satisfaction, we introduce the new functional form
to represent interdependent preferences over income distributions in a dynamic setting
(Section 2). The employed data and estimation methods are described in Section 3.
Section 4 contains the application to Germany over the period 1990 to 2004. Section 5
concludes. Descriptive statistics of the data employed are reported in the Appendix.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Interdependent Preferences
Interdependent preferences, that is, preferences that depend directly on the situation of
others, were modelled formally for the ﬁrst time in the theory of consumer’s demand. The
2The simple correlation between happiness and income in the United States, 1994 data, for example,
is only 0.20, as shown by Easterlin (2001, p.468).
3See Fehr and Schmidt (2003) for an extensive survey.
3phenomenon that utility functions depend on other people’s consumption is known as the
relative income hypothesis (Duesenberry, 1949), diﬀerentiating further between keeping up
with the Joneses where preferences depend on current consumption, and catching up with
the Joneses where preferences depend on lagged consumption. Leibenstein (1950) was the
ﬁrst to introduce demand functions that explicitly took into account the desire to be ‘in
style’, the bandwagon and snob eﬀects, as well as conspicuous consumption. Since then
the literature has advanced to a high level of sophistication exploring the implications
of such preferences on the theory of asset pricing (Abel, 1990, Campbell and Cochrane,
1999, Galí, 1994), on Pareto optimality (Collard, 1975, and Shall, 1972), on the theory
of optimal taxation (Boskin and Sheshinki, 1978, Dupor and Liu, 2003, Ljungqvist and
Uhlig, 2000, and Abel, 2005), on the determination of work hours (Bowles and Park, 2005),
on public spending (Ng, 1987), and on the allocation of resources (Fershtman and Weiss,
1993). In varying formulations, with preferences deﬁned over general consumption goods
or on an individual’s identity, the theory modelled social interactions.4 Robson (1992)
investigates the implications of including status directly in utility functions deﬁned over
wealth on attitudes to risk, and Corneo and Jeanne (2001) and Konrad (1992) perform
an analogous exercise with respect to growth rates. Similarly, Frank (1984) examines the
role of interdependent preferences on wage determination in a model where preferences
are deﬁned over wage distributions.
T h e r ea r ea l t e r n a t i v ea p p r o a c h e st h a td on o ti n c o r p o r a t ec o n c e r n sf o rr e l a t i v es t a n d i n g
directly into utility functions. These models, in the presence of market imperfections, are
able to generate them endogenously “as ‘instrumental’, in reduced form utility functions,
while maintaining the standard economic modelling methodology based on optimizing in-
dividuals who have stable preferences over the goods and services they and their children
consume” (Postlewaite, 1998, p.784). Within this framework, questions such as how con-
cern for relative standing can inﬂuence savings and growth rates have been investigated
(Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite, 1992, and Corneo and Jeanne, 1998).
Another group of contributions oﬀer plausible explanations of the emergence of in-
terdependent preferences and concern for status. Samuelson (2004) and Sethi and So-
manathan (2001), for example, provide evolutionary explanations of the phenomenon.
Bisin and Verdier (1998), on the other hand, attribute the formation of such preferences
to the intergenerational transmission of cultural traits. Others (Bester and Güth, 1997,
4See Becker (1974) and Becker and Stigler (1977) for the ﬁrst group, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) for
the second. Sobel (2005) provides an interesting discussion on similarities and diﬀerences between the
two strands of the literature.
4Fershtman and Weiss, 1998, Koçkesen, Ok and Sethi, 2000, for example) examine the
circumstances under which evolution would lead to the survival of individuals with inter-
dependent preferences.
Experimentalists make use of interdependence in preferences to explain the behavior of
subjects that repeatedly violate the game theoretical predictions.5 Alternative speciﬁca-
tions of utility functions were proposed, and the most relevant for the present contribution
is that of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) that we report in detail below.
We now describe our model formally. There is a ﬁxed set N = {1,...,n} of n ≥ 2
individuals and their incomes are recorded in an income distribution x =( x1,...,xn) ∈ Rn
+,
where Rn
+ is the set of n-dimensional vectors with non-negative components. We indicate
the mean of x by λ(x). For x ∈ Rn
+, Bi(x)={j ∈ N | xj >x i} is the set of individuals
with a higher income than i; similarly, Wi(x)={j ∈ N | xj <x i} is the set of individuals
with a lower income than i. The utility function of individual i, i =1 ,...,n, proposed by
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is:
Ui (x)=xi + α
P




j∈Wi(x) (xi − xj)
n
, (1)
where α ≤ β ≤ 0. The utility of each individual depends positively on own income and
negatively both on disadvantageous inequality (the second term in (1)) and advantageous
inequality (the third term in (1)). According to Fehr and Schmidt, individuals dislike
inequitable distributions. “They experience inequity if they are worse oﬀ in material terms
than the other players in the experiment, and they also feel inequity if they are better
oﬀ. (...) (H)owever, we assume that, in general, subjects suﬀer more from inequity that
is to their material disadvantage than from inequity that is to their material advantage.”
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, p.822.)
Axiomatic characterizations of this utility function have been provided by Neilson
(2006) and Sandbu (2005). Only few other studies have provided axiomatic bases for in-
terdependent preferences, among which Ok and Koçkesen (2000) axiomatized the relative
income hypothesis, Neilson and Stowe (2005) preferences depending on the rank of other
individuals, Karni and Safra (2002) preferences with moral value judgement, and Segal
and Sobel (2006) preferences inﬂuenced by the behavior of others.
5For extensive surveys see Fehr and Schmidt (2003) and Sobel (2005).
52.2 The Measurement of Deprivation and Satisfaction
In the income distribution literature, relative standing plays its most signiﬁcant role in
the measurement of deprivation and satisfaction.T h e d e ﬁnition of relative deprivation
adopted is the following: “We can roughly say that [a person] is relatively deprived of
Xw h e n( i )h ed o e sn o th a v eX ;( i i )h es e e ss o m eo t h e rp e r s o no rp e r s o n s ,w h i c hm a y
include himself at some previous or expected time, as having X, (iii) he wants X, and (iv)
he sees it as feasible that he should have X” (Runciman, 1966, p.10). When considering
income as the object of relative deprivation, absolute individual deprivation is simply the
sum of the gaps between an individual’s income and the incomes of all individuals richer
than him, while in the relative case, the income gaps are normalized by mean income.
Formally, Yitzhaki (1979) and Hey and Lambert (1980) specify the deprivation felt by a
person with income xi with respect to a person with income xj as:
di (x)= ( xj − xi) if xi <x j
=0 else
, (2)
while the deprivation function of the person with income xi is:
Di (x)=
P
j∈Bi(x) (xj − xi)
n
. (3)
Following this early literature, Chakravarty (1997) proposes to look at a relative concept
of deprivation felt by a person with income xi with respect to a person with income xj,
namely, their income share diﬀerential
di (x)
λ(x)
. Now, the total relative deprivation function
of the person with income xi is:
Di (x)=
P
j∈Bi(x) (xj − xi)
nλ(x)
. (4)
When the comparison is conducted with respect to poorer individuals, we obtain the
relative satisfaction function of the person with income xi,S i (x). The function Si (x) is
Si (x)=
P
j∈Wi(x) (xi − xj)
nλ(x)
. (5)
In the income distribution literature it is implicitely assumed that well-being of an in-
dividual depends negatively on deprivation and positively on satisfaction.6 Deprivation
and satisfaction are very similar to the concepts of disadvantageous and advantageous
6“If people have no reason to expect or hope for more than they can achieve, they will be less discontent
with what they have, or even grateful simply to be able to hold on to it. But if, on the other hand, they
6inequality of Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) utility function. If we believe that the normal-
ization of the income gaps should take into account not only the dimension of the society
but also mean income then equation (1) could be rewritten as:
Ui (x)=xi + αDi (x)+βSi (x). (6)
This normalization could be more appropriate when comparing diﬀerent time periods, as
i st h ec a s ef o rt h ep r e s e n tc o n t r i b u t i o n .
In this setting, Bossert and D’Ambrosio (2007) introduce time as an additional dimen-
sion in the determination of the level of deprivation felt by an individual. They suggest
that a person’s feeling of relative deprivation today depends on a comparison with those
who are better oﬀ today but there is an additional determinant: the feeling of depri-
vation relative to a person with a higher income is more pronounced if this person was
not better oﬀ yesterday, that is, he has passed the individual under consideration when
moving from yesterday’s distribution to today’s. Relative deprivation of an individual in
this framework is determined by the interaction of two components, namely, the average
gap between the individual’s income and the incomes of all individuals richer than him
(the traditional way of measuring individual deprivation), and a function of the number
of people who were ranked below or equal in the previous-period distribution but who
are above the person under consideration in the current distribution. Similar considera-
tions can be made when measuring relative satisfaction, with the latter increasing in the
number of people passed when going from yesterday to today.
2.3 A Dynamic-Status-Concerned Utility Function
In a similar spirit, concerns for an individual’s own and relative history could be incorpo-




















where xt−1 is the income distribution of the previous period and xt that of the current
period. Indicating by B
−
i = Bi(xt)∩Bi(xt−1) the set of individuals that currently have and
previously had an income higher than i,b yB
+
i = Bi(xt)\Bi(xt−1) the set of individuals
that have but did not have an income higher than i, by W
−
i = Wi(xt) ∩ Wi(xt−1) the
have been led to see as a possible goal the relative prosperity of some more fortunate community with
which they can directly compare themselves, then they will remain discontent with their lot until they
have succeeded in catching up” (Runciman, 1966, p.9).
7set of individuals that have and had an income lower than i,b yW
+
i = Wi(xt)\Wi(xt−1)
the set of individuals that have but did not have an income lower than i, we propose





















































where τ,ϑ,κ,χ,ε,η are parameters indicating the weight on the individual’s utility of
alternative income speciﬁcations. The well-being of an individual depends at time t on four
components. i) The absolute component, that is, the standard of living of the individual
at time t. We take as its proxy the level of income experienced in the previous period,
that is the income level the person was used to. ii) The absolute dynamic component
aims at capturing own income’s history and is incorporated as own income percentage
change. With interdependencies, individual well-being depends on relative standing. In
the setting of this paper, the individual takes into account not only his position in the
income scale (such as the rank) but also distances in incomes distinguishing between richer
and poorer individuals. We follow Runciman’s suggestion in this comparison and assume
that: “The magnitude of a relative deprivation is the extent of the diﬀerence between
the desired situation and that of the person desiring it” (Runciman, 1966, p.10). An
individual compares himself to others and the intensity of his deprivation and satisfaction
feelings depends directly on distances in incomes. To incorporate individuals’ histories
we separate the relative income performance in two components distinguishing those that
are and were ahead or behind the individual under analysis, depending on the comparison
being made with respect to richer or poorer individuals, from those that experienced a
change in the relative rankings. As such iii) the relative component measures the relative
income gaps at the same time t between the individual and the others that are and were
ahead or behind, depending on the side of the distribution considered; iv) the relative
dynamic component, on the other hand, captures how individual i performed from time
t − 1 to time t with respect to others’ incomes. It is based on the relative income gaps
at the same time t of the individual income and that of the others that are and were
not ahead or behind the individual considered, that is, those that have passed or have
8been passed in going from yesterday to today. It is with this component that we model
Hirschman’s “advances of others”.
The following eﬀects of alternative income speciﬁcations on individual utility are to
be expected:
1. The absolute component has a positive contribution on satisfaction with own income,
hence τ>0;
2. the absolute dynamic component has a positive eﬀect on satisfaction with own
income only when positive, that is, when the individual experiences an income
growth, otherwise it should be non positive, hence ϑ>0;
3. satisfaction with income should depend positively on relative satisfaction and nega-
tively on relative deprivation according to the income distribution literature, hence
according to this interpretation κ<0 and χ>0; on the other hand, Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) report that individuals dislike inequitable distributions, hence in
view of this κ<0 and χ<0,w i t hκ ≤ χ<0. We do not commit at this stage to
any of the theories and let our result show which of the two ﬁts better the German
s o c i e t y . T h es a m ec o n s i d e r a t i o n sh o l df o rt h ep a r a m e t e r so ft h er e l a t i v ed y n a m i c
component: ε<0 and η>0 for the theories belonging to the income distribu-
tion literature; according to Fehr and Schmidt we expect ε<0 and η<0,w i t h
ε ≤ η<0. Alternatively, when being passed is seen as good auspice for the own
future income prospect, hence Hirschman’s tunnel eﬀect does exist, ε>0;7
4. satisfaction with passing and disappointment with being passed for a given distribu-
tion of income at time t should be captured by the relative intensity of the two parts
of the relative component and the relative dynamic component. When individuals
feel more deprived (or ‘suﬀer’ according to Fehr and Schmidt’s theory) with respect
to those who passed them from time t − 1 to time t, we should observe |ε| > |κ|,
similarly, η>χfor individuals who feel more satisﬁed if they were able to pass
others;
5. if own income history plays a role in the sentiment experienced when passed or being
passed, then the parameters of the relative dynamic component ε and η could diﬀer
7On this issue Hirschman (1973, p.559) writes: “(...) changes in the income of B lead to changes in A’s
welfare not only because A’s relative position in the income scale has changed, but also because changes
in B’s fortunes will aﬀect A’s prediction of his own future income. (...) B advances, and this leads A to
predict an improvement in his own position as well.”
9between those experiencing an income growth and those on a decreasing income
path. Individuals could feel diﬀerently with respect to others depending on own
history: an individual earning more today than yesterday could not experience any
negative feeling with respect to those that were able to pass him — he is a winner
and could be sympathetic to other winners. In addition, seeing other individuals
doing better than him today could be a signal of the level of mobility existing in
the society. The individual may think that he could be one of them tomorrow and
interpret the being passed as a good auspice. In this sense, Hirschman’s tunnel
eﬀect could be driven only by winners.
To sum up, the signs of the parameters should be: τ>0, ϑ>0, κ<0 and χ>0,o r
κ<0 and χ<0,w i t hκ ≤ χ<0, ε<0 and η>0, or ε<0 and η<0,w i t hε ≤ η<0,
or ε>0, |ε| > |κ|,a n d ,η>χ .
3 The Data and Methods
Generally, an individual’s well-being is measured in microdata by interviewing people in
surveys using a single-occasion, self-report question. Papers on this subject make use
of both cross-sectional data (e.g. Eurobarometer Surveys, United States’ General Social
Survey), and panel data (e.g. the German Socio-Economic Panel, the British Household
Panel Survey, the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey and the European Community
Household Panel). Panel data are mandatory to test the eﬀect of the individual’s own
and relative to others’ history on well-being. In addition panel data allows to control
for otherwise unobserved individual characteristics. This is especially important if these
unobservables are systematically correlated with reported well-being. In particular, the
dataset used in the paper is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, see below). Our
measure of the individual’s well-being, i.e. ‘satisfaction with income’ is measured on an
11-point scale, ranging from 0 (‘completely dissatisﬁed’) to 10 (‘completely satisﬁed’).
Landua (1991) argues that there is evidence of panel eﬀects concerning these satis-
faction scales, i.e. respondents tend to use these scales diﬀerently after ‘getting used’ to
them (especially there is a tendency away from the extreme values such as ‘10’). This will
have to be considered when interpreting the changes in satisfaction over the ﬁrst waves
of a panel. Frick, Goebel, Schechtman, Wagner, and Yitzhaki (2006) conﬁrm this ﬁnding
for more recent waves of SOEP data providing evidence for learning eﬀects on behalf of
the respondents with respect to satisfaction as well as income.
10The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is an ongoing panel survey with a yearly
re-interview design (see http://www.diw.de/gsoep). The starting sample in 1984 was
almost 6,000 households based on a random multi-stage sampling design. A sample of
about 2,200 East German households was added in June 1990, half a year after the fall
of the Berlin wall. This gives a very good picture of the GDR society on the eve of the
German currency, social and economic uniﬁcation which happened on July 1, 1990. In
1994/95 an additional subsample of 500 immigrant households was included to capture
the massive inﬂux of immigrants since the late 1980s. Finally, in 1998 and 2000 two more
random samples were added which increased the overall number of interviewed households
in 2000 to about 13,000 with approximately 24,000 individuals aged 17 and over.
The data used in this analysis covers the period 1990 (the ﬁr s td a t aa v a i l a b l ef o r
the East German sample) to 2004. Due to the above mentioned learning eﬀects, we
exclude wave 1 of the more recently started sub-samples. Our overall sample is pooling
all adult respondents with valid information on income and subjective satisfaction, leaving
us with approximately 160,100 observations based on 26,600 individuals in East and West
Germany.
The income measure we investigate is monthly net household income. This so-called
‘income screener’ is supposed to give a measure of the more regular income components
received by all household members at the time of the interview. This variable might
be an inferior measure of economic well-being when compared to annual income since
it tends to neglect certain irregular income components (like Christmas bonuses, annual
bonuses, etc.) but it certainly ﬁts better to our time-dependent measures of well-being.8
In addition the interviews are conducted during the ﬁrst months of the year and, by that
time, yearly income cannot be known to the household yet. In order to compare income
over time, all income measures are deﬂated to 2000 prices, also accounting for purchasing
power diﬀerences between East and West Germany. In order to control for diﬀerences in
household size and the economies of scale, we apply an equivalence scale with an elasticity
of 0.5, given by the square root of household size. Descriptive statistics (see the Appendix)
are based on weighted data correcting for design diﬀerences in sampling probabilities and
selective non response after wave one.
Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable on well-being an appropriate re-
gression model would be an ordered probit. In order to make full use of the panel nature
of our data, controlling for otherwise unobserved individual characteristics and potentially
8Bivariate correlation for annual income (based on previous year income) and well-being is considerably
lower than the one with respect to monthly income, the values being .32 as opposed to .36.
11diﬀerent use of the underlying satisfaction scale (running from 0 to 10) across individu-
als, we should apply a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. Unfortunately, such a ﬁxed-eﬀects ordered
probit estimator does not exist in standard statistical software packages. As an approxi-
mation, however, we make use of a ﬁxed-eﬀects regression model, assuming linearity (see
also Hamermesh, 2001, Schwarze and Haerpfer, 2007, and Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters,
2004). We also run a random-eﬀects model in order to investigate the eﬀects of time
invariant control variables, such as gender and migration status.
4 The Results
Applied papers relevant to the analysis presented here include D’Ambrosio and Frick
(2007) with an empirical implementation of relative deprivation and its eﬀects on well-
being. A vast quantity of papers, on the other hand, have estimated models of interde-
pendence of preferences even if these contributions often appeared disconnected from the
theoretical literature surveyed in Section 2. The majority of applied studies on subjective
assessments and happiness are more rooted in the psychological and sociological literature
than in economics when motivating their studies.9 Among those only a few, to the best of
our knowledge, deal with variables and data similar to those of the present contribution,
which uses genuine panel data and self-declared satisfaction with income.10 These include
Burchardt (2005) who investigates the process of adaptation to falling and rising incomes
and the eﬀect of expectations based on the ﬁrst ten waves of the British Household Panel
Survey. Burchardt shows that changes in objective circumstances inﬂuence satisfaction
with income. Chan, Ofstedal and Hermalin (2002) model change in perceived adequacy
of income in terms of actual change in income and other relevant factors based on two-
wave panel data for Singapore and Taiwan. It is shown that there is a strong relationship
between the two. Ravallion and Lokshin (2001) base their analysis on two-wave panel
data for Russia and conclude that income and its changes have much power in explaining
perceived well-being. Our paper diﬀers for the introduction of dynamic components, that,
to the best of our knowledge, have not appeared in the literature before and represent the
novelty of our approach. Wunder and Schwarze (2006) does not belong to the previous
group since the variable of interest is job satisfaction, but the application is based on the
same dataset we use, SOEP, and the relative income components of the utility function
9See Easterlin (2002), and Frey and Stutzer (2002) for an extensive survey on happiness.
10More often the variable of interest is self declared satisfaction with overall life or job satisfaction and
the data are cross-sectional.
12of each worker are those proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), see equation (1). In this
contribution, it is a utility function depending positively on disadvantageous inequality to
be interpreted as the presence of Hirschman’s tunnel eﬀect. We believe that our extension
with dynamic components is better suited for this aim since advances of similar individ-
uals are better captured by the relative dynamic component we propose. In other words,
advances are, by deﬁnition, produced by actual movements and are not just comparisons
within a static concept. In addition, the separation of the relative income performance
with respect to richer individuals in two components distinguishing those that are and
were ahead the individual under analysis from those that experienced a change in the
relative rankings allows for the joint presence of a negative and positive eﬀect of disad-
vantageous inequality, the former being captured by the relative component, the latter by
the relative dynamic component (which is indeed what our results show, see below).
At the heart of interdependence in preferences are comparisons that take place among
members of the same reference group. The identiﬁcation of the appropriate ones is a very
diﬃcult, since normative, task. It could even be possible that the same individual has
diﬀerent reference groups, one for each variable of interest (see Runciman, 1966, Ch.2 for
a clear discussion of this issue). In this paper we decided to inspect three alternatives and
assume that individuals compare themselves nationwide (ﬁrst reference group), to those
living in the same federal state (second reference group) or to peers with the same level of
education (third reference group). The second reference group aims at capturing the local
dimension in the comparison. Unfortunately, the dataset we have access to does not have
suﬃcient observations to run the analysis at a neighborhood, say, the postal code level.
The third reference group is more linked to merit and returns to investments in human
capital. As a control for our results being not driven by the choice of the three reference
groups we also decided to allocate individuals at random to eight groups. This random
grouping takes into account potential clustering eﬀects arising from the initial sampling
procedure followed when collecting the data and makes sure that individuals from the
same primary sampling unit do not belong to the same random group. Descriptive results
at the level of the nationwide reference group are given in the Appendix.
In the following multivariate regression models, we control for sex, age (age squared),
marital status, immigration status, residency in East or West Germany, education, house-
hold composition, homeownership (as a proxy for household wealth) and unemployment.11
11This unemployment index is calculated at the aggregate household level, relating the number of
months in registered unemployment over the previous year to the number of months with potential
employment of all adult household members.
13In the ﬁxed-eﬀect speciﬁcation by deﬁnition the time independent variables sex and immi-
gration status are dropped from the estimation. In order to control for potential panel or
learning eﬀects, we also include a dummy variable identifying individuals with 3 and more
interviews as a proxy for the interviewing experience in the panel. In order to capture the
eﬀect of the state of the economy, we include regional unemployment rates at the federal
state level. The variables of the relative and relative dynamic components were topcoded
at the 99th percentile of each year and reference group to reduce the impact of outliers.
For each reference group, we estimate two models where in the second speciﬁcation we
allow the parameters of the relative and relative dynamic components to vary depending
on the individual experiencing an income growth or being on a decreasing income path.
Results on the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimators are given in Table 1 (for the ﬁrst model) and
2 (for the second model). The personal control variables yield in principle the expected
results: becoming better educated and getting married and those who live together with
dependent children in the household tend to be more satisﬁed. East Germans are less
satisﬁed with their income. Becoming an homeowner is negatively related to income sat-
isfaction, indicating that net of income eﬀects, homeowners have higher income aspirations
due to increased housing costs induced by their mortgage repayments. The experience
of unemployment within an individual’s household has the expected detrimental eﬀect
on well-being. The institutional control variable on regional unemployment rate is not
signiﬁcant in almost all speciﬁcations once controlling for the individual labor market
success.
More important to our research question appear to be the coeﬃcients of the alterna-
tive income components: absolute, relative, and their dynamic counterparts. The absolute
component of income has always the expected positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on individ-
ual’s well-being: a given sum of money has signiﬁcant explanatory power for income
satisfaction. The absolute dynamic component has the expected signs, positive for those
experiencing an income growth, negative otherwise. Regarding the relative component,
results are in favour of the theories belonging to the income distribution literature: Ger-
mans are satisﬁed with respect to poorer individuals and feel deprived when compared to
richer ones. In all models the feeling of satisfaction (REL.DYN. Satisfaction in Table 1)
is higher with respect to poorer individuals they were able to pass from time t−1 to time
t, that is individuals who were richer at time t − 1 and poorer in t, as opposed to that
felt with respect to individuals who have always been richer (REL. Satisfaction in Table
1). For deprivation, on the other hand, it depends on the speciﬁcation considered: the
coeﬃcient on the relative dynamic part is negative only when the comparison takes place
14at the federal state level and, when signiﬁcant, it is always lower than the corresponding
coeﬃcient in the relative component. When we distinguish at the federal state level be-
tween those experiencing an income growth from those loosing income (results reported
in Table 2), we observe that this result is driven by individuals loosing income since the
coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant for the gainers. Germans, who loose income, do feel deprived
with respect to those who were able to pass them, but this sentiment of deprivation is
lower than the one they experience when compared to individual who have always been
richer than them. For the other reference groups, when no distinction is made between
those experiencing an income growth and those loosing income (results reported in Table
1), the coeﬃcient of the relative dynamic deprivation component is positive, and in ab-
solute value lower than the corresponding coeﬃcient in the relative component: Germans
do not prove any feeling of deprivation with respect to individuals who have passed them,
actually, being passed makes them more satisﬁed with their income. Being passed is seen
as good auspice for future gains, thus our ﬁndings support Hirschman’s (1973) tunnel
eﬀect. When distinguishing, as in Table 2, between those experiencing an income growth
and those loosing income, we conclude that this result is driven by those gaining income
since the coeﬃcient is insigniﬁcant for those on a decreasing income path.
The random-eﬀects models show that women are more satisﬁed than men, and native
born persons are more satisﬁed than immigrants, in all models. However, due to below
average income position of migrants in Germany, the latter eﬀect is somewhat reduced
once we introduce income.12
5C o n c l u s i o n
A r ew es a t i s ﬁed with income? The answer to the opening question of this paper is
that people’s satisfaction depends on what they observe around them and on the income
histories of themselves and the others. Analyzing data for Germany from 1990 to 2004 we
showed that individual well-being, measured by perceived income satisfaction, is, indeed,
a function of absolute, relative and dynamic components.
The separation of the relative income performance with respect to richer individuals
in two components—distinguishing those that are and were ahead the individual under
analysis, considered in the relative component of deprivation, f r o mt h o s et h a te x p e r i -
12Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier tests led to conclude that the appropriate speciﬁcation of
the models is the ﬁxed-eﬀects one. The results from the random eﬀects models are available upon request
to the authors.
15enced a change in the relative rankings, included in the relative dynamic component of
deprivation—has the advantage of reconciling two views that were, so far, considered in
opposition in the literature.13 An individual’s well-being is negatively aﬀected by the
comparison with permanently richer individuals, a standard result in studies on relative
income.14 At the same time, the presence of newly richer individuals plays the informa-
tional role described in Hirschman’s tunnel eﬀect for individuals on an increasing income
path. This ﬁnding for an advanced economy such as Germany is new and somehow un-
expected given that the predictions of the literature were in favor of its presence only in
early stage of economic development or more volatile societies. Our results show that the
tunnel eﬀect does play a major role in the assessment of individual well-being in stable
societies, such as today’s Germany.
6 Appendix: Descriptive Results
Information given in this appendix relates to the nationwide level only. The corresponding
data on the various absolute, relative and dynamic measures for the regional, educational
and random reference groups do not show a relevant degree of variation—all those are
available from the authors upon request.
Table A1 provides simple descriptive statistics on dependent and independent variables
included in the multivariate analyses as given in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Pairwise
correlations are depicted in Table A2: Satisfaction with income (YSAT) is positively
related to absolute income as well as to income changes (our absolute, dynamic term).
With respect to the relative and the relative dynamic measures we ﬁnd statistically sig-
niﬁcant correlations in both directions, negative for relative deprivation and positive for
relative satisfaction. Figure A1 gives the marginal distribution for the dependent variable
on “Satisfaction with income (YSAT)” in the pooled dataset for 1992 to 2004. Control-
ling for eventual changes of this distribution across time, Figure A2 reveals that—at least
with respect to “satisfaction with income”—Germany appears to be a rather stable society
since the early 1990s. Finally, Figure A3 presents the distribution of the diﬀerences of
“Satisfaction with income” over the period [t − 1,t], again pooled over the whole period
under investigation indicating a very symmetric picture, i.e., in the society as a whole,
satisfaction with income appears to change in similar way to the good as well as to the
bad.
13See on this point Hirschman (1973) and Senik (2004), among others.
14See, for example, Clark and Oswald (1996).
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Tables and Figures: 
 
Table 1: Correlates of income satisfaction in Germany 1990-2004 - Results from fixed 










 Income  Satisfaction 
-0.050** -0.049** -0.052**  -0.051**  Age 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) 
0.003** 0.003** 0.003**  0.003**  Age squared 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
-0.359** -0.504** -0.395**  -0.358**  East 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072)  (0.072) 
0.002 0.002  0.044**  0.002  Years of education 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) 
0.127** 0.123** 0.127**  0.127**  # of children in HH 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009) 
-0.039* -0.036+ -0.032+  -0.040*  Homeowner 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)  (0.019) 
-0.006** -0.007** -0.007**  -0.006**  Unemployment index  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.171** 0.170** 0.171**  0.172**  Married 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)  (0.021) 
0.018 0.015 0.011  0.018  3 or more interviews  
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)  (0.028) 
0.004 0.007  0.009*  0.004  Unemployment Rate 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) 
0.342** 0.366** 0.390**  0.347**  ABS: 
Income of the previous year  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)  (0.018) 
0.001** 0.002** 0.002**  0.001**  ABS. DYN.: 
Positive % change  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
-0.015** -0.012** -0.016**  -0.015**  ABS. DYN.: 
Negative % change  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
-2.539** -2.292** -2.372**  -2.506**  REL.: 
Deprivation  (0.063) (0.060) (0.060)  (0.062) 
0.836** -0.995** 0.647*  0.666*  REL. DYN.: 
Deprivation  (0.301) (0.260) (0.271)  (0.285) 
0.204** 0.261** 0.110**  0.206**  REL.: 
Satisfaction  (0.032) (0.034) (0.033)  (0.032) 
0.676** 0.408+ 0.767**  0.714**  REL. DYN.: 
Satisfaction  (0.247) (0.232) (0.225)  (0.245) 
7.612** 7.510** 7.210**  7.611**  Constant 
(0.123) (0.123) (0.123)  (0.123) 
Observations 160182  160182  160182  160182 
Individuals 26323  26323  26323  26323 
R-squared 0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. (Standard errors in parentheses). 
Additional control variables include dummies for year of observation. 
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Table 2: Correlates of income satisfaction in Germany 1990-2004 - Results 










 Income  Satisfaction 
-0.049** -0.049** -0.052**  -0.050**  Age 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) 
0.003** 0.003** 0.003**  0.003**  Age squared 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
-0.342** -0.494** -0.384**  -0.350**  East 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072)  (0.072) 
0.002 0.002  0.045**  0.002  Years of education 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) 
0.128** 0.124** 0.127**  0.127**  # of children in HH 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009) 
-0.040* -0.037* -0.033+  -0.040*  Homeowner 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)  (0.019) 
-0.006** -0.007** -0.007**  -0.006**  Unemployment Index 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
0.172** 0.170** 0.171**  0.172**  Married 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)  (0.021) 
0.017 0.015 0.011  0.017  3 or more interviews  
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)  (0.028) 
0.003 0.006  0.008+  0.004  Unemployment Rate 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) 
0.352** 0.380** 0.398**  0.356**  ABS: 
Income of the previous year  (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)  (0.019) 
0.003** 0.002** 0.003**  0.002**  ABS. DYN.: 
Positive % change  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
-0.014** -0.012** -0.015**  -0.014**  ABS. DYN.: 
Negative % change  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) 
-2.623** -2.338** -2.461**  -2.547**  REL: 
Deprivation for positive % change  (0.070) (0.067) (0.068)  (0.069) 
9.930** -0.495 5.131**  3.144**  REL. DYN: 
Deprivation for positive % change  (1.368) (0.798) (1.030)  (0.912) 
0.189** 0.249** 0.095**  0.199**  REL: 
Satisfaction for positive % change  (0.033) (0.035) (0.034)  (0.033) 
0.431+ 0.269 0.540*  0.569*  REL. DYN: 
Satisfaction for positive % change   (0.254) (0.237) (0.231)  (0.250) 
-2.481** -2.272** -2.328**  -2.483**  REL: 
Deprivation for negative % change  (0.064) (0.061) (0.062)  (0.063) 
0.493 -1.139** 0.378  0.370  REL. DYN: 
Deprivation for negative % change  (0.308) (0.272) (0.279)  (0.297) 
0.168** 0.186**  0.074  0.158**  REL.: 
Satisfaction for negative % change  (0.044) (0.046) (0.045)  (0.043) 
11.042** 3.580** 5.469**  6.079**  REL. DYN: 
Satisfaction for negative % change  (1.763) (1.301) (1.356)  (1.497) 
7.497** 7.494** 7.149**  7.575**  Constant 
(0.124) (0.123) (0.125)  (0.124) 
Observations 160182  160182  160182  160182 
Individuals 26323  26323  26323  26323 
R-squared 0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. (Standard errors in parentheses). 
Additional control variables include dummies for year of observation. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation from SOEP. 
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics of variables used in multivariate analyses.   
 
Variable Mean    (Std.dev.) 
Satisfaction with income  6.180 (2.221) 
Age 46.11  (16.53) 
Age squared  239.9 (164.8) 
East .284  (.451) 
Years of education  11.73 (2.48) 
# of children in HH  .579 (.919) 
Homeowner   .444 (.497) 
Unemployment index (HH)  8.34 (21.63) 
Married .657  (.474) 
3 or more interviews  .972 (.162) 
Unemployment Rate (Region)  11.69 (4.63) 
ABS:  Income of the previous year  1.362 (.668) 
ABS DYN.:  Positive % change  11.18 (21.54) 
ABS DYN.:  Negative % change  6.86 (12.48) 
REL:  Deprivation   .217 (.188) 
REL DYN:  Deprivation   .018 (.028) 
REL:  Satisfaction   .205 (.322) 
REL DYN:  Satisfaction   .017 (.031) 
REL:  Deprivation for positive % change   .100 (.158) 
REL DYN:  Deprivation for positive % change  .003 (.005) 
REL:  Satisfaction for positive % change   .120 (.275) 
REL DYN:  Satisfaction for positive % change   .015 (.032) 
REL:  Deprivation for negative % change   .116 (.184) 
REL DYN:  Deprivation for negative % change  .015 (.029) 
REL:  Satisfaction for negative % change   .085 (.219) 
REL DYN:  Satisfaction for negative % change   .002 (.004) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from SOEP.   
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Income of the 
previous year 
(absolute) 
0.3247*       
% Change in 
income since 
previous year  
(absolute 
dynamic) 
0.0649*  -0.2590*      
Relative 




-0.0819* 0.1427* -0.5779* 0.2569*     
Relative 




0.0858* -0.1119* 0.7188* -0.0663* -0.1989* 0.2259* 
•  significant at 5%  
Source: Authors’ calculations from SOEP. 
 
 
 Figure A1:  Satisfaction with income.  
 
Satisfaction is measured on a 11-point scale from 0=completely dissatisfied to 
10=completely satisfied.  
Source: Authors’ calculations from SOEP. 
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Figure A2: Time series on satisfaction with income. 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from SOEP. 
 
 
Figure A3:  Difference in satisfaction with income over the period [t-1,t].  
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from SOEP.  